A Surprising Result Encountered in Various Extensions of the Traditional Deterrence Game

Carlson Lisa J. () and Dacey Raymond ()
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Carlson Lisa J.: University of Idaho
Dacey Raymond: University of Idaho

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2012, vol. 18, issue 1, 13

Abstract: The purpose of this note is to present a surprising result regarding crisis initiation and termination. The decision problem treated here is distilled from an extension of the two-sided incomplete information version of the traditional deterrence game. We employ a two-stage analysis of the decision problem faced by the Challenger that formally links the onset of a crisis to the decision over whether to escalate the crisis should the Challenger face resistance from the Defender. The two-part result is as follows. A crisis is more likely to be initiated by a Challenger who will ultimately back down if Defender chooses to resist than by a Challenger of the same type who will choose to escalate if Defender chooses to resist. Contrariwise, a crisis is less likely to be initiated by a Challenger who will ultimately escalate if Defender chooses to resist than by a Challenger of the same type who will choose to back down if Defender chooses to resist.

Keywords: Deterrence; Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1515/1554-8597.1264

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