 Paramilitaries and Electoral SupportPeace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2015, vol. 21, issue 2, 191-216 Abstract: This paper examines the tactical redistribution of public resources by an incumbent seeking reelection in a country in the midst of an armed conflict. The illegal armed groups in Colombia are known to have extreme ideological beliefs; the guerrillas lean far to the Left, and the paramilitaries, far to the Right. The model and the empirical results show that regions with powerful groups who have a defined political ideology are less strategically attractive when it comes to the distribution of government resources. Nevertheless, when an illegal group can coerce voters to support a candidate and decide between candidates, as in the case of paramilitaries, redistribution is targeted to the illegal group. As a natural experiment, this paper empirically tests the effect of a policy to demobilize and reintegrate the members of paramilitary groups into society, so as to show the decisions on redistribution change when paramilitary forces do not exercise control in the municipalities. Keywords: redistribution; elections; public goods; cash transfers (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:21:y:2015:i:2:p:191-216:n:4 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy is currently edited by Raul Caruso More articles in Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy from De Gruyter |
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