Consequential and Appropriate Decisions in International Conflict: An experiment with students operating a fishing dispute simulator

Kuperman Ranan ()
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Kuperman Ranan: University of Haifa – International Relations, Abba Khoushy Ave 199, Haifa 3498838, Israel

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2016, vol. 22, issue 2, 131-157

Abstract: This research compares decision making patterns of two groups of subjects engaged in an international conflict against a virtual actor within a computerized simulated environment that operates according to a set of predetermined rules. Subjects assigned to the first group could attempt to improve their status by choosing from a set of different types of policies, such as negotiating an agreement, threatening, mobilizing forces, and use of force. Subjects assigned to the second group also played against a virtual opponent that was programed to behave in an identical manner and produce identical payoffs. However, instead of each policy being labeled with a substantive meaning, policies were categorized in a formal manner as Policies A, B, C, etc. Therefore the only criterion for evaluating a policy was on the basis of outcomes. The results of this experiment reveal that providing a meaning to each policy rather than a formal label influenced policy preferences and impeded the ability of the subjects to learn from experience.

Keywords: microworld; experiment; norms; decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2016-0006

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