From Numerical Considerations to Theoretical Solutions: Rational Design of a Debtor Creditor Agreement

Langlois Catherine () and Langlois Jean-Pierre
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Langlois Catherine: McDonough School of Business, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets NW, Washington, DC 20057, United States of America
Langlois Jean-Pierre: Department of Mathematics, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, United States of America

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2016, vol. 22, issue 4, 403-412

Abstract: This paper illustrates how the rational design of an international agreement can be investigated using software and numerical solutions as preliminary steps to a formal modelling of the agreement. The paper examines the repetition of a Called Bluff game interpreted as representing the stylized incentives of a debtor-creditor relationship.

Keywords: game theory; politics; international relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2016-0023

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