Goal and Strategies of an Insurgent Group: Violent and Non-violent Actions
Andres Zambrano and
Hernando Zuleta
Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2017, vol. 23, issue 2, 7
Abstract:
We model the strategy of an insurgent group that follows a pattern of prolonged popular war but negotiates with the government. The main results of the model are the following: (i) If the marginal probability of signing a peace treaty is significantly low when the guerrilla invests little on non-violent strategies, then they will continue to fight and allocate all its resources on military power. (ii) Ceteris paribus, the future stock of military power of a guerrilla is increasing in their current military power and its budget. (iii) The greater the government’s military power, the lower the share of resources guerrillas allocate to violent strategies. We also provide two examples of negotiation processes between the Colombian government and FARC, and relate it to our theoretical results.
Keywords: Economic conflict; negotiation strategies; guerrilla; utility functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N46 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2016-0039
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