Patterns of Rebellion: A Model with Three Heterogeneous Challengers

Keisuke Nakao

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2018, vol. 24, issue 1, 10

Abstract: This article proposes a dynamic model of rebellion, where three players individually decide to challenge their common adversary. It is formally demonstrated that the pattern of rebellion is determined endogenously, depending on the challengers’ resolve and strength. In other words, a challenger with more resolve and/or strength tends to fight earlier than others do.

Keywords: bandwagoning; strategic coordination; rebellion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 F51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2017-0021

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