Rivalry Type and Cyber Operations: “Hot” Rivalries, “Cold” Rivalries, and Cyber Incidents, 1990–2009

Mauslein Jacob A. () and Pickering Jeffrey ()
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Mauslein Jacob A.: Department of Intelligence, Mercyhurst University, Eire, PA 16546, USA
Pickering Jeffrey: Department of Political Science, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2021, vol. 27, issue 2, 169-195

Abstract: Cyber operations targeting government computers and network infrastructure are becoming increasingly common and have the potential to be extremely damaging. Interstate rivalry has been shown to shape a wide range of global patterns. This paper examines the intersection between these two important phenomena. It builds upon previous scholarship by developing a broader and more nuanced theory of the rivalry-cyber operation relationship and testing it empirically with newly developed data on cyber operations from 1990 to 2009. Our results go beyond existing studies to demonstrate that certain types of “cold” rivalries experience elevated numbers of cyber operations, while other “hot” rivalries experience fewer incidents. This finding sheds new light on our general understanding of the volume and location of cyber operations in the international system. It also underscores important distinctions among rivalries that help to explain significant cyber activities and may help to improve our grasp of other emerging threats.

Keywords: strategic rivalry; enduring rivalry; cyber operations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2020-0046

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