Conflict Under Incapacitation and Revenge: A Game-Theoretic Exploration

Mukherjee Puja ()
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Mukherjee Puja: Senior Research Fellow (SRF), 30160 Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute , Kolkata, India

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2024, vol. 30, issue 2, 137-170

Abstract: In real life, winning a conflict sometimes does not end the conflict. Revenge motivations can stay and provide momentum to the conflict, thus leading to further escalation of the conflict. This is known as the value effect or vengeance effect of revenge. However, the presence of revenge can lead to de-escalation of the conflict out of self-deterrence and sometimes retaliation out of revenge is not possible if the combatant is incapacitated. Hence, the impact of revenge on the level of violence is a priori not clear. This paper is an attempt to answer that question. Using a two-period game of conflict this paper tries to show how desire and capabilities of the combatants to exact revenge can influence the intensity of the conflict. This paper shows the following: how the strategies of the combatants are influenced by the value effect of revenge, self-deterrence and incapacitation of the combatants; how the stronger combatant is in a favourable position in the conflict and can prevent its opponent from going into second period conflict out of revenge; when the combatants are equally strong the intensity of the conflict starts falling with time. It also lays out some real-life conflicts and existing empirical work to support the results.

Keywords: conflict; revenge; capability; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/peps-2023-0058

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