Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US

Fischer Sven (), Sebastian Goerg and Hamann Hanjo ()
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Fischer Sven: Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Hamann Hanjo: Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany

Review of Law & Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 1, 79-110

Abstract: How do barely incentivized norms impact incentive-rich environments? We take social enterprise legislation as a case in point. It establishes rules on behalf of constituencies without institutionalized means of enforcement. By relying primarily on managers’ other-regarding concerns while leaving corporate incentive structures unaltered, how effective can such legislation be? We ran a laboratory experiment with a framing likened to German corporate law which traditionally includes social standards. Our results show that a stakeholder provision, as found in both Germany and more recent US regulation, cannot overcome material incentives. Yet even in the absence of adverse incentives the stakeholder duty does not foster other-regarding behavior. Our experiment illustrates the paramount importance of taking into account both incentives and framing effects when designing institutions. We tentatively discuss potential policy implications for social enterprise legislation and the stakeholder debate.

Keywords: stakeholder value; social enterprise; benefit corporation; corporate law; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D01 D03 L21 M14 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US (2013)
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2014-0036

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