Centralization versus Decentralization of Legislative Production and the Effect on Litigation: A Case Study

Giuseppe Di Vita ()

Review of Law & Economics, 2015, vol. 11, issue 2, 267-291

Abstract: This paper presents an empirical investigation into the effects on the duration of disputes of the coordination externalities that arise from the decentralization of laws and regulatory power from the state to the regions. To this aim we consider Italy, whose territory is divided into twenty regions, using a dataset derived from 800 judgements pronounced by the Italian regional administrative courts over eight years, from 2000 to 2007. The most important result of our research is that in sectors where European legislation prevails, and lower coordination externalities are observed, we find a shorter duration of disputes, whilst in economic sectors more exposed to decentralized legislation, with greater coordination externalities, disputes tend to have a longer duration.

Keywords: coordination externalities; duration of disputes; Italian regional administrative courts; multi-level regulatory governance; survival analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C41 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0022 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:11:y:2015:i:2:p:267-291:n:5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html

DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0022

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().