A Note on Trial Delay and Social Welfare: The Impact of Multiple Equilibria

Tim Friehe and Miceli Thomas J. ()
Additional contact information
Miceli Thomas J.: Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, 309 Oak Hall,365 Fairfield Way, Storrs, CT 06269-1063, USA

Review of Law & Economics, 2017, vol. 13, issue 1, 15

Abstract: Greater trial delay is commonly associated with decreasing demand for trials, thereby bringing about an equilibrium for a given trial capacity. This note highlights that – in contrast to this premise – trial delay may in fact increase trial demand. Such an outcome is established for a scenario in which the number of cases is endogenous based on the deterrence effect of lawsuits. That trial demand may increase with longer delay makes multiple stable equilibria possible. This reality has important policy implications, which are discussed.

Keywords: trial; delay; care; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2015-0044 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on Trial Delay and Social Welfare: The Impact of Multiple Equilibria (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:13:y:2017:i:1:p:15:n:7

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rle/html

DOI: 10.1515/rle-2015-0044

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Law & Economics is currently edited by Francesco Parisi

More articles in Review of Law & Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().