A Note on Trial Delay and Social Welfare: The Impact of Multiple Equilibria

Tim Friehe and Thomas Miceli

No 2015-08, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Greater trial delay is commonly associated with decreasing demand for trials, thereby bringing about an equilibrium for a given trial capacity. This note highlights that – in contrast to this premise – trial delay may in fact increase trial demand. Such an outcome is established for a scenario in which the number of cases is endogenous based on the deterrence effect of lawsuits. That trial demand may increase with longer delay makes multiple stable equilibria possible. This reality has important policy implications, which are discussed.

Keywords: trial; delay; care; multiple equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2015-08.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
Journal Article: A Note on Trial Delay and Social Welfare: The Impact of Multiple Equilibria (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2015-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark McConnel ().