Legal Compliance and Detection Avoidance: Results on the Impact of Different Law-Enforcement Designs

Bruttel Lisa (), Friehe Tim () and Rehm Lennart ()
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Bruttel Lisa: Department for Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Str. 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany
Friehe Tim: Public Economics Group, University of Marburg, Am Plan 1, 35032 Marburg, Germany
Rehm Lennart: Department for Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, August-Bebel-Str. 89, 14482 Potsdam, Germany

Review of Law & Economics, 2025, vol. 21, issue 2, 157-197

Abstract: This paper provides experimental evidence on how various law enforcement designs impact legal compliance and detection avoidance behaviors. Our three experiments explore differences in enforcement based on two factors: whether the fine revenue is allocated to the victim or the enforcer, and whether the enforcer has an active role in influencing enforcement. While the overall results indicate that these design variations have minimal impact on behavior on average, data from our most comprehensive study reveals contrasting effects on taking rates between men and women.

Keywords: compliance; law enforcement; avoidance; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/rle-2023-0112

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