Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction

Christian At and Chappe Nathalie
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Chappe Nathalie: University of Franche-Comte

Review of Law & Economics, 2008, vol. 4, issue 1, 35-44

Abstract: This paper extends the law enforcement literature with imperfect information by introducing a new technology to improve information acquisition. Individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of detection and can postpone their decision whether or not to commit crime in order to learn about the actual probability of detection. We show that the optimal fine is the maximal one when information acquisition is easy.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Working Paper: Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction (2008)
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DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1152

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