Timing of Crime, Learning and Sanction

Christian At and Nathalie Chappe ()
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Nathalie Chappe: CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques (UR 3190) - UFC - Université de Franche-Comté - UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté [COMUE]

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Abstract: The paper extends the law enforcement literature with imperfect information by introducing a new technology to improve information acquisition. Individuals are imperfectly informed about the probability of detection and can postpone their decision whether or not to commit crime in order to learn about the actual probability of detection. We show that the optimal fine is the maximal one only when the information acquisition is easy.

Keywords: Economics of crime; law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Review of Law and Economics, 2008, 4 (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00447999

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