Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market

Philippe De Donder, Helmuth Cremer, Dudley Paul and Rodriguez Frank
Additional contact information
Dudley Paul: Royal Mail Group
Rodriguez Frank: Oxera

Review of Network Economics, 2011, vol. 10, issue 3, 24

Abstract: We build a model where a postal incumbent offering single piece, transactional and advertising mail competes with postal entrants and with a firm offering an alternative medium. We solve for the optimal prices under various competition assumptions. We calibrate the model and provide numerical simulations in order to shed light on the impact of these assumptions on volumes and welfare levels.

Keywords: non direct mail; substitution; displacement ratio; Ramsey prices; calibration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1446-9022.1223 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market (2010)
Working Paper: Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:10:y:2011:i:3:n:4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rne/html

DOI: 10.2202/1446-9022.1223

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Network Economics is currently edited by Lukasz Grzybowski

More articles in Review of Network Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().