Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market

Helmuth Cremer, Philippe De Donder, Paul Dudley and Frank Rodriguez

No 601, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

Abstract: We build a model where a postal incumbent offering single piece, transactional and advertising mail competes with postal entrants and with a firm offering an alternative medium. We solve for the optimal prices under various competition assumptions. We calibrate the model and provide numerical simulations in order to shed light on the impact of these assumptions on volumes and welfare levels.

Date: 2010-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market (2011)
Working Paper: Welfare and Pricing of Mail in a Communications Market (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:22459

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