Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets

Marc Bourreau and Pinar Dogan ()

Review of Network Economics, 2012, vol. 11, issue 1, 33

Abstract: We consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, and the intensity of post-entry competition. We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product differentiation to the level of access is lower, and when the investment cost is higher. We also show that the incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service differentiation is sufficiently high (low).

Keywords: infrastructure sharing; access; telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/1446-9022.1339 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets (2012)
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets (2010)
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets (2010)
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:rneart:v:11:y:2012:i:1:n:1

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/rne/html

DOI: 10.1515/1446-9022.1339

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Network Economics is currently edited by Lukasz Grzybowski

More articles in Review of Network Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().