Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets
Marc Bourreau and
Pinar Dogan ()
Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government
Abstract:
In this paper, we consider an unregulated incumbent who owns a broadband infrastructure and decides on how much access to provide to a potential entrant. The level of access, i.e., the network elements that are shared in the provision of competing broadband services, not only determines the amount of investment the entrant needs to undertake to enter the market, but also the intensity of post-entry competition. We consider an access scheme that determines an access level and an associated two-part tariff. We show that the equilibrium level of access is higher when the sensitivity of product differentiation to the level of access is lower, and when the marginal investment cost is higher. We also show that the unregulated incumbent sets a suboptimally low (high) level of access if the degree of service differentiation is sufficiently high (low).
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Published in HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series
Downloads: (external link)
http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4454152/Bourreau_LevelAccess.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets (2012) 
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets (2012)
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets (2010) 
Working Paper: Level of Access and Competition in Broadband Markets 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:hksfac:4454152
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Scholarly Articles from Harvard Kennedy School of Government Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office for Scholarly Communication ().