Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets

Enrico Böhme ()

Review of Network Economics, 2016, vol. 15, issue 2, 91-115

Abstract: The paper provides an analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. In a framework with two distinct types of agents on either side of the market, we show that under incomplete information the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly lower than the benchmark level with complete information. In addition, we find that it is possible in the monopoly optimum that the contract for low-demand agents is more expensive than the one for high-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is contract-specific.

Keywords: monopolistic screening; second-degree price discrimination; two-sided markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 L12 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets (2012)
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DOI: 10.1515/rne-2015-0051

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