Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets

Enrico Böhme ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: The present paper provides a descriptive analysis of the second-degree price discrimination problem on a monopolistic two-sided market. By imposing a simple two-sided framework with two distinct types of agents on one of its market sides, it will be shown that under incomplete information, the extent of platform access for high-demand agents is strictly reduced below the benchmark level (complete information). In addition, the paper’s findings imply that it is feasible in the optimum to charge higher payments from low-demand agents if the extent of interaction with agents from the opposite market side is assumed to be bundle-specific.

Keywords: two-sided markets; second-degree price discrimination; monopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 L12 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-net
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets (2016)
Working Paper: Second-Degree Price Discrimination on Two-Sided Markets (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:40951

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