Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale: une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public

Claudia Keser, Jean-Louis Rullière and Marie Claire Villeval

Economie & Prévision, 2004, vol. n° 164-165, issue 3, 81-92

Abstract: When collective agreements apply to all unionised and non-unionised employees, what is the rationale behind joining a union? Thepaper presents an experiment on a two-stage game. Inthe first stage, the decision to join a union is modelled as a voluntary contribution to a public good. Inthe second stage, the unionised employees bargain with the employer over wages that will then be paid to all unionised and non-unionised employees. Theexperimental evidence reveals that: i) union membership is higher than predicted by theory, but it declines over time, ii) the employees?bargaining power increases with the size of the union but not as much as predicted.

Keywords: union; experimental economics; bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Journal Article: Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale: une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public (2004)
Working Paper: Le paradoxe de l'adhésion syndicale: une approche expérimentale en termes de jeu de bien public (2004)
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