Responsabilité individuelle et fiscalité
Louis Lévy-Garboua (),
Claude Montmarquette () and
Marie Claire Villeval ()
Economie & Prévision, 2008, vol. n° 182, issue 1, 19-31
The deficit in collective-goods financing raises the issue of individual responsibility in groups and societies. Can a tax policy that strengthens individual responsibility reduce free-riding behavior? We use experimental data to compare the efficiency of two tax policies aimed at supporting the provision of collective goods. In the first, the tax burden is uniform for all subjects; in the second, the tax liability is adjusted to the individual's voluntary contribution. Our results show that the uniform tax policy provides a greater incentive to free-riding, while the individualized tax policy favors cooperation by increasing individual responsibility. Individualizedtaxation fostersconvergenceof voluntarycontributions towardthe optimum and reduces the frequency of deficits.
Keywords: collective good; taxation; responsibility; experimentation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Responsabilité individuelle et fiscalité (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_182_0019
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