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La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ?

Pierre Fleckinger () and Matthieu Glachant

Economie & Prévision, 2009, vol. n° 190-191, issue 4, 95-105

Abstract: Voluntary agreements between regulators and firms have been in use for at least two decades. In recent years, however,firms have tended to commit to better environmental or social behavior in a more unilateral fashion. This phenomenon isknown as the rise of ?Corporate Social Responsibility? (CSR). In such circumstances, are voluntary agreements stillwelfare-enhancing ? To explore this question, we use a policy game involving a regulator and a firm. We show that theanswer is ambiguous. In particular, it depends on the regulator?s bargaining power.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Preemption of Public Regulation; Voluntary Agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Journal Article: La responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (2009) Downloads
Working Paper: La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (2009) Downloads
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