La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ?

Pierre Fleckinger () and Matthieu Glachant

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: Are Corporate Social Responsibility and Voluntary Agreements Complementary ? Voluntary agreements between regulators and firms have been in use for at least two decades. In recent years, however,firms have tended to commit to better environmental or social behavior in a more unilateral fashion. This phenomenon isknown as the rise of "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR). In such circumstances, are voluntary agreements stillwelfare-enhancing ? To explore this question, we use a policy game involving a regulator and a firm. We show that theanswer is ambiguous. In particular, it depends on the regulator's bargaining power.

Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility; Preemption of Public Regulation; Voluntary Agreements; Responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise; Préemption de la régulation; Accords volontaires (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://minesparis-psl.hal.science/hal-00447028v1
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Published in Economie et Prévision, 2009, 4-5 (190-191), pp.95-105

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Journal Article: La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (2009)
Journal Article: La responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (2009)
Working Paper: La responsabilité sociale de l'entreprise et les accords volontaires sont-ils complémentaires ? (2009)
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