Réglementation acceptable d'une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale
Stefan Ambec,
Alexis Garapin,
Laurent Muller and
Carine Sebi
Economie & Prévision, 2009, vol. n° 190-191, issue 4, 107-122
Abstract:
We conduct a laboratory experiment to test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game : an access feeand subsidy system, transferable quotas, and non-transferable quotas. Theory predicts that they all reduce resource usefrom free access to the same target level without hurting users. We find that, on average, the regulator?s target is less likelyto be met with fees than with the other regulation tools. The fee system tends to select the most efficient users moreconsistently, but leads to more inequality. All regulations fail to make every user better off, although the two market-basedinstruments outperform the non-transferable quotas on this criterion.
Keywords: common-pool resource; experimental economics; regulation; quota; tax (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Journal Article: Règlementation acceptable d’une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale (2009)
Working Paper: Réglementation acceptable d'une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale (2009)
Working Paper: Réglementation acceptable d’une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:ecoldc:ecop_190_0107
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