Réglementation acceptable d’une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale

Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller () and Carine Sebi
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Laurent Muller: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Carine Sebi: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game : an access fee and subsidy system, transferable quotas, and non-transferable quotas. Theory predicts that they all reduce resource usefrom free access to the same target level without hurting users. We find that, on average, the regulator's target is less likely to be met with fees than with the other regulation tools. The fee system tends to select the most efficient users more consistently, but leads to more inequality. All regulations fail to make every user better off, although the two market-based instruments out perform the non-transferable quotas on this criterion.

Keywords: COMMON POOL RESOURCE; RESSOURCE COMMUNE; EXPERIMETAL ECONOMICS; REGULATION; TAX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Published in Economie et Prévision, 2009, 190-191, pp.107-122. ⟨10.3406/ecop.2009.7999⟩

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Journal Article: Réglementation acceptable d'une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale (2009)
Journal Article: Règlementation acceptable d’une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale (2009)
Working Paper: Réglementation acceptable d'une ressource commune: une analyse expérimentale (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02654211

DOI: 10.3406/ecop.2009.7999

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