Les effets de la coordination et de la coopération internationales sur le déclenchement des crises de change spéculatives

Olivier Loisel and Philippe Martin

Revue économique, 2001, vol. 52, issue 2, 233-248

Abstract: We analyse the effects of international coordination and cooperation on the trigger action and the contagion of currency crises, in a three-country model built on the ?escape clause? approach of fixed exchange rate systems. We show that coordination decreases the possibility of self-fulfilling expectations of simultaneous speculative crises in the region and reduces the set of multiple equilibria, but that it may however induce more contagion. The effect of cooperation is qualitatively similar to that of coordination, but quantitatively still more important. However, in order to get credible vis-à-vis the private agents, cooperation requires the settlement of a heavy commitment technology, for example a supranational organization which enforces the agreement. Classification JEL : F42, F41, F33

JEL-codes: F33 F41 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Journal Article: Les effets de la coordination et de la coopération internationales sur le déclenchement des crises de change spéculatives (2001)
Working Paper: Les effets de la coordination et de la coopération internationales sur le déclenchement des crises de change spéculatives (2001)
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