Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique

Georges Casamatta () and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

Revue économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 3, 537-544

Abstract: This article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates. Classification JEL : D72 ; D82

JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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