Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique

Georges Casamatta () and Wilfried Sand-Zantman

Revue Économique, 2002, vol. 53, issue 3, 537-544

Abstract: [fre] Un modèle de citoyens-candidats en information asymétrique. . Cet article propose une extension en information asymétrique du modèle de citoyens-candidats développé par Osborne-Slivinsky [1996]. Nous montrons que l'introduction d'information asymétrique sur les goûts des agents conduit à relati­viser la prédominance des candidats médians. Nous montrons également que l'introduction de cette incertitude tend à augmenter le nombre de candidats. [eng] Asymmetric information in a citizen-candidate model. . This article proposes an extension in an asymmetric information framework of the citizen-candidates model developed by Osborne-Slivinsky[1996]. We show that introducing asymmetric information on the tastes of the agents tends to minor the prevalence of median candidates. We also show that this uncertainty leads to an increase in the number of candidates.

Date: 2002
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