Rationalité limitée et jeux de machines

Sylvain Béal

Revue économique, 2005, vol. 56, issue 5, 1033-1063

Abstract: We study one aspect of the rationality of players in repeated games. The central assumption is that player?s choice is limited to strategies that can be computed by a model of computation (or machine). We investigate two of such models : the finite automaton and the perceptron. Each model of computation gives its own abilities to the player that uses it. We consider several possible measures for the complexity of a machine. We survey in this article the most important results on the complexity of strategies for the class of machine games. Classification JEL : C72

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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