De la manipulation des élections indirectes

Sebastian Bervoets and Vincent Merlin ()

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 3, 767-777

Abstract: This paper is devoted to the analysis of two tiers voting rules. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction and next, an aggregation procedure collects the results from the jurisdictions in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, it is possible that they can manipulate the result of the election, except when the voting rule is the Priority rule, which assigns a priority order to the candidates. Classification JEL : D71, D72

JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_583_0767 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2007-3-page-767.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: De la manipulation des élections indirectes (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_583_0767

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().