De la manipulation des élections indirectes

Vincent Merlin () and Sebastian Bervoets

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper is devoted to the analysis of two tiers voting rules. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction and next, an aggregation procedure collects the results from the jurisdictions in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, it is possible that they can manipulate the result of the election, except when the voting rule is the Priority rule, which assigns a priority order to the candidates.

Keywords: two-tiers voting; gerrymandering; élections indirecte; manipulation; découpage électoral (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in Revue Economique, 2007, 58 (3), pp.767--777

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: De la manipulation des élections indirectes (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00148836

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().