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Protection des actionnaires et bénéfices privés. Doit-on aller plus loin que la loi ?

Christian At, Nathalie Chappe, Pierre-Henri Morand (pierre-henri.morand@univ-avignon.fr) and Lionel Thomas

Revue économique, 2007, vol. 58, issue 6, 1207-1220

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal managerial compensation when the shareholders may invest in private protection to reinforce their protection. The optimal contract exhibits three tolls: the wage, the level of dividends (which is equivalent to the level of diversion) and the level of private protection. Under asymmetric information, we show that investing in private protection does not necessarily reduce the level of profit diverted. Classification JEL : G34, D82.

JEL-codes: D82 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Protections des actionnaires et bénéfices privés: doit-on aller plus loin que la Loi ? (2007)
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