Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail

Clémence Berson

Revue économique, 2011, vol. 62, issue 3, 409-417

Abstract: Discrimination models have difficulties to reproduce a persistent discrimination without assuming that prejudiced firms are more productive and results lead to workers? segregation. The model uses oligopsony and heterogeneity of workers? preferences to obtain a persistent discrimination. Firms hire both types of workers and pay a lower wage to the workers discriminated against. Consequently, the existence of discrimination allows a non-zero profit for unprejudiced firms and they have also no incentives to push out prejudiced firms. Classification JEL : J42, J71, L13.

JEL-codes: J42 J71 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_623_0409 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2011-3-page-409.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail (2011)
Working Paper: Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail (2011)
Working Paper: Concurrence imparfaite et discrimination sur le marché du travail (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_623_0409

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().