Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governance

Thibault Darcillon

Revue économique, 2013, vol. 64, issue 3, 445-455

Abstract: Using a panel fixed effects logit model and a Cox conditional model in gap time, this paper provides new evidence on the linkages between the adoption of pro-shareholder reforms in corporate governance at the firm level and the government ideological affiliation in 16 oecd countries over 1970-2009. Among other results, we find strong evidence in favor of a positive effect of a right-wing government on the timing of adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation. In addition, we find no empirical evidence for the compensation hypothesis that argues that an increase in employment protection legislation would make easier the adoption of pro-shareholder measures by left-wing governments. Classification JEL : G38, P16.

JEL-codes: G38 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Working Paper: Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governance (2013)
Working Paper: Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governance (2013)
Working Paper: Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governance (2013)
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