 Mesurer l'impact de l'effet partisan sur les réformes de corporate governanceUniversité Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL Abstract: Using a panel fixed effects logit model and a Cox conditional model in gap time, this paper provides new evidence on the linkages between the adoption of pro-shareholder reforms in corporate governance at the firm level and the government ideological affiliation in 16 OECD countries over 1970-2009. Among other results, we find strong evidence in favor of a positive effect of a right-wing government on the timing of adoption of minority shareholder protection legislation. In addition, we find no empirical evidence for the compensation hypothesis that argues that an increase in employment protection legislation would make easier the adoption of pro-shareholder measures. Keywords: political partisanship; institutional change; compensation hypothesis; Corporate Governance; effet partisan; changement institutionnel; hypothèse de compensation (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Revue Economique, 2013, 64 (3), pp.445-455. ⟨10.3917/reco.643.0445⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00824968 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.