L'effet de compensation morale ou comment les « bonnes actions » peuvent aboutir à une situation indésirable

Sophie Clot, Gilles Grolleau (), Lisette Ibanez and Peguy Ndodjang

Revue économique, 2014, vol. 65, issue 3, 557-572

Abstract: Recent research argues that a good deed can disinhibit individuals and lead them to achieve undesirable deeds (e.g., choosing a salad which leads to increased snack intake). This so-called licensing effect has been recently documented in several analyzes, but we still lack a stabilized analytical framework. We also mention several contributions in behavioral economics that can explain licensing effects by alternative rationales. We aim at defining and characterizing the licensing effect and emphasize plausible circumstances under which it can lead to unexpected adverse effects. We use examples from several domains such as food consumption or prosocial behaviors. Several policy implications are developed. We identify several research extensions to better understand this licensing effect. We also indicate strategies that can be used to overcome this bias. Classification JEL : Q50, D03, D04

JEL-codes: D03 D04 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_653_0557 (application/pdf)
http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2014-3-page-557.htm (text/html)
free

Related works:
Working Paper: L'effet de compensation morale ou comment les "bonnes actions" peuvent aboutir à une situation indésirable (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_653_0557

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Revue économique from Presses de Sciences-Po
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire ().