Insatisfaction à l’égard de l’impôt et séquence temporelle du prélèvement: une étude expérimentale

Radu Vranceanu, Angela Sutan and Delphine Dubart

Revue économique, 2019, vol. 70, issue 6, 1227-1240

Abstract: This paper reports experimental results from a linear sanction cost variant of the power-to-take game, with implications for tax collection policies. This framework allows to compare a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) tax collection system with an ex-post tax collection system in which payroll taxes are levied at the end of the fiscal year. In the second system, taxpayers might develop a feeling of income ownership, and express higher dissatisfaction if the government appropriates a part of it. In our data, dissatisfaction with taxation, as proxied by the sanction in the power-to-take game, is significantly higher in the ex-post tax collection system compared with the PAYE system. Communication opportunities are associated with lower sanction rates, yet the communication channel is not used extensively by participants. Classification JEL : C91, H26, D01.

Keywords: tax collection system; pay-as-you-earn; endowment effect; power-to-take game; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D01 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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