L’étrange « jugement majoritaire »

Jean-François Laslier

Revue économique, 2019, vol. 70, issue 4, 569-588

Abstract: The ?majority judgment? is an evaluative voting rule that picks a candidate with the best median evaluation. This paper deals with the question: What does one do when choosing according to the best median? This principle amounts to find which half-population should be neglected in order to satisfy, in the sense of a Rawlsian compromise, the other half. This principle clashes with the definition of democracy as the participation of everyone, not half of the population plus one. Moreover, providing the highest possible level of satisfaction to that half-population which is the easiest to satisfy is not what is done by the rules called ?majoritarian,? that respect the Condorcet principle. On the contrary, these rules favor consensual solutions, in particular in standard political environments. This explains why the majority judgment often yields surprising outcomes.

Keywords: voting rules; majority judgment; evaluative voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Related works:
Working Paper: L’étrange « jugement majoritaire » (2019)
Working Paper: L’étrange « jugement majoritaire » (2019)
Working Paper: L'étrange « Jugement Majoritaire » (2017)
Working Paper: L'étrange « Jugement Majoritaire » (2017)
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