Experimental Evidence on Gender Differences in Lying Behaviour

SeEun Jung () and Radu Vranceanu

Revue économique, 2017, vol. 68, issue 5, 859-873

Abstract: The paper reports the results of an ultimatum game experiment with asymmetric information where proposers can send responders misleading information about their endowments. We allow all possible gender combinations in the proposer-responder pairs. In the pairs, the players? genders are common knowledge. Proposers? messages that underestimate the actual amount are widespread. Gender interaction has little impact on the frequency of lying. However, men tend to state bigger lies than women, and state the largest lies when paired with a woman. On average, men make higher offers than women, and also have lower acceptance rates, particularly when they are paired with women.

Date: 2017
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