Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ?

Edith Ginglinger

Revue d'économie financière, 2012, vol. N° 106, issue 2, 227-242

Abstract: Corporate governance rules tend to focus on shareholders? equality and strengthening board monitoring. Although these features intend to protect investors, results of empirical analyses indicate that the one-size-fits-all model may destroy shareholders? value for certain firms. Allowing each firm to develop the particular mix of management and monitoring that best suits its individual needs is often preferable to increase firm?s value. Classification JEL: G32, G34.

JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Journal Article: Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ? (2012)
Working Paper: Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ? (2012)
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