Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ?

Edith Ginglinger

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Abstract: Corporate governance rules tend to focus on shareholders' equality and strengthening board monitoring. Although these features intend to protect investors, results of empirical analyses indicate that the one-size-fits-all model may destroy shareholders' value for certain firms. Allowing each firm to develop the particular mix of management and monitoring that best suits its individual needs is often preferable to increase firm's value.

Keywords: gouvernance d'entreprise; actionnariat salarié; bloc de contrôle; conseil d'administration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06
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Published in Revue d'économie financière, 2012, 106, pp.227-242

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Journal Article: Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ? (2012)
Journal Article: Quelle gouvernance pour créer de la valeur ? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00712576

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