Ventes liées et concurrence sur les marchés énergétiques

Marion Podesta ()

Revue d'économie industrielle, 2011, vol. n° 133, issue 1, 79-98

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of an increase in competition on the bundle strategies in energy markets. In the monopoly case, the mixed bundling strategy is efficient. However, in oligopolistic environment bundling can reduce profits. Through a discrete choice model, we show that adopting an independent pricing strategy, for electricity and gas, is a Nash equilibrium for a duopoly and this outcome is Pareto dominating. Nevertheless, the entry of a third firm in only one market makes bundling strategies more attractive but incumbent firms are in a prisoner dilemma situation. They would be better off if bundling was not be possible.

Keywords: Competition; Bundling; Energy Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Working Paper: Ventes liées et concurrence sur les marchés énergétiques (2006)
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