Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite

Armel Jacques

Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2006, vol. 72, issue 4, 385-412

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the links between flexibility technological choices and tacit collusion in a duopoly. We prove that adoption of flexible technologies improves tacit collusion, when competition is à la Bertrand, but makes it more difficult, when competition is à la Cournot. We characterize the technological equilibria in this repeated game framework. We show that semi-collusion improves the adoption of flexible technologies.

Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite (2006)
Working Paper: Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite (2006)
Working Paper: Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite (2006)
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