Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite

Armel Jacques

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the links between flexibility technological choices and tacit collusion in a duopoly. We prove that adoption of flexible technologies improves tacit collusion, when competition is à la Bertrand, but makes it more difficult, when competition is à la Cournot. We characterize the technological equilibria in this repeated game framework. We show that semi-collusion improves the adoption of flexible technologies.

Keywords: Collusion; politique de la concurrence; choix technologiques; flexibilité (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Published in Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, 2006, 72 (4), pp.385-413. ⟨10.3917/rel.724.0385⟩

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Journal Article: Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite (2006)
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Working Paper: Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01300695

DOI: 10.3917/rel.724.0385

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