Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders
Giulio Codognato and
Recherches économiques de Louvain, 2013, vol. 79, issue 4, 75-88
In this paper, we reconsider two models of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium proposed by Busetto et al. ((2008), (2011)): a version of the Shapley?s window model for mixed exchange economies ? la Shitovitz and its reformulation ? la Cournot-Walras. We introduce the assumption that preferences of the traders belonging to the atomless part are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. This assumption permits us to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the Shapley?s window model - called Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium - without introducing further assumptions on atoms? endowments and preferences previously used by Busetto et al. (2011). Then, we show that the set of the Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations coincides with the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allocations. JEL Classification: C72, D51.
Keywords: strategic market games; noncooperative oligopoly; atoms; atomless part (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders (2013)
Working Paper: Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a Cobb-Douglas continuum of traders (2013)
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