Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders

Giulio Codognato and Ludovic Julien ()
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Giulio Codognato: Università degli Studi di Udine, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche

No 2013044, Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) from Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES)

Abstract: In this paper, we revisit two models of noncooperative oligopoly in general equilibrium proposed by Busetto et al. (2008, 2011), a version of Shapley’s “window” model for mixed exchange economies following Shitovitz and its reformulation following Cournot-Walras. We introduce the assumption that the preferences of traders belonging to the atomless portion are represented by Cobb-Douglas utility functions. This assumption permits us to prove the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in Shapley’s window model, known as the Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium, without introducing further assumptions of atom endowments and preferences previously used by Busetto et al. (2011). We then show that the set of Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations coincides with that of Cournot-Walras equilibrium.

Keywords: Strategic market games; Noncooperative oligopoly; Atoms; Atomless part (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
Note: Special Issue : Recent Developments in Strategic Interactions and General Equilibrium
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Noncooperative Oligopoly in Markets with a Cobb-Douglas Continuum of Traders (2013)
Working Paper: Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a Cobb-Douglas continuum of traders (2013)
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