Surenchères salariales et conflictualité: une approche expérimentale

Fabienne Tournadre and Marie Claire Villeval

Revue d'économie politique, 2002, vol. 112, issue 1, 157-171

Abstract: Based on a non cooperative model with asymmetric information tested by means of a laboratory experiment, this paper examines the influence of a negotiation outcome on the demand behavior in subsequent negotiations. While the assumption of inflationary wage claims is rejected by the data, a better information of the bargaining parties reveals to be insufficient to decrease the risk of conflict. Classification JEL : C78, J51, J52

Keywords: bargaining; asymmetric information; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 J51 J52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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