Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille: une revue de littérature

Raphaëlle Bellando

Revue d'économie politique, 2008, vol. 118, issue 3, 317-339

Abstract: This paper surveys the literature on the agency problem in portfolio management delegation. The fact that there is no optimal contract in this case is well-documented. More recent papers have shown that this problem can be solved by adding to the contract some management constraints. However some empirical studies about implicit incentives demonstrate the convexity of the manager?s compensation, due to an asymmetric flow-performance relationship. Finally, we review empirical work about two important consequences of this agency problem: herding and excessive risk taking.

Keywords: portfolio management; agency problem; mutual funds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Le conflit d'agence dans la gestion déléguée de portefeuille: une revue de littérature (2008)
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